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Abstract
This paper presents a market design for the management of noise
disturbance created by aircraft tra±c around large airports. A mar-
ket for tradable noise permits allows noise generators to compensate
harmed residents. We show that the noise permit markets allow the
achievement of the planner's optimal allocation of °ights provided that
she/he does not over-weight the bene¯t of economic activity compared
to the disutility of noise disturbances. The fact that zones are likely to
be strategic players does not fundamentally alter this ¯nding. Because
of the market auctioneer's information constraints, noise permits are
likely to redistribute windfall gains to residents located in non-critical
zones. This entices landlords to increase their land/house rents there
and to design smaller houses in the long run.
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11 Introduction
The air transport industry has become a key factor of economic activity. Air
transport generates signi¯cant social and economic bene¯ts related to trade,
employment, investment, tourism and leisure opportunities. However, like
most human activities, air transport also generates less welcome external ef-
fects, among which noise disturbances are probably the most salient ones1.
Noise disturbances constitute a hot and topical societal problem for all major
airports. Indeed, there seem to be no clear solutions to the issues about how to
accommodate the residents su®ering from noise disturbances and about how to
accordingly determine the number and the distribution of aircraft movements
around the airports.
Intriguingly, the economic literature has to a large extend neglected to
discuss the design of policy instruments that could e±ciently balance social
cost of noise disturbances and economic bene¯ts of airport economic activity.
While many discussions have focused on technological improvements (quieter
airplanes, alternative land-o® and kick-o® procedures) or on the de¯nition of
noise standards, they have not addressed the question of social optimality.2 It
is well-known that command-and-control policies do not lead to social opti-
mality in the context of asymmetric information, which is relevant to airport
regulation since information about residents' noise disutility is di±cult to col-
lect (we shall come back on that point). Even though, in some situations,
regulators have been able to create noise abatement incentives by imposing
di®erent fees in function of the (theoretical) noise pressures of aircraft cate-
gories, they have been unable (or unwilling) to calibrate those fees to the actual
noise disutility of the residents surrounding airports. In fact, the e±ciency of
such fees has not been established; the adequacy of residents' (absence of)
compensation has many times remained an open question; and the optimality
of the spatial distribution of aircraft movements around airports has not been
demonstrated.
It is often argued that residents are already compensated for the social
cost of noise disturbances by lower housing rents and prices. Yet, the fact that
1Another topical external impact is its contribution to climate change (air transport
contributes to 3 percent of world greenhouse gases emissions). To cope with this problem,
air transport sector will soon be included in the emission targets negotiated under the Kyoto
protocol and in the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) which regulates carbon
dioxide emissions.
2See for instance Janic (1999) and Brueckner (2003). Brueckner and Girvin (2006) discuss
the optimal taxation of aircrafts given a ¯xed global quota of noise emissions but do not
consider the social cost of residents' noise exposure.
2residents are compensated does not imply that social costs are internalized.
Whereas such costs can be shifted from tenants to landlords who are bound
to o®er lower house rents, they are generally not shifted to the ¯rms that
generate the noise externality. Except in the rare situations where airports
acquire the surrounding properties3, the social costs of noise disturbances are
not internalized and there exists a need to design economic instruments that
organize such an internalization.
The debate about the internalization of social costs is well-known to economists.
Noting the reciprocal nature of harmful e®ects, Coase (1960) suggested to de-
¯ne appropriate property rights over the source of those e®ects and showed
that regulation can be accomplished e®ectively and e±ciently by a market.
The present paper applies this idea in the context of noise disturbances and
airport activity. In our setting, the tradeable noise permits will constitute
the means of the negotiation between residents and airline companies. And in
order to compensate the residents for noise exposure the property rights will
be assigned to them. By selling those rights on a market, the residents will
express their willingness to accept noise.
The contribution of our paper is to show how a local market of tradeable
noise permits allows to implement the socially optimal number and spatial
distribution of °ights among routes. The market for tradeable noise permits is
organized as follows. Residents are organized by zones that sell noise permits
to airline companies. Each noise permit consists of a right for one aircraft
to °y over a speci¯c zone during some time period. The supply of permits
is set by the zones and bounded only by technical feasibility.4 A (neutral)
auctioneer collects the bids of zones' supplies and airline companies' demands,
determines the price that clears the market and redistributes the permits ac-
cording to the bids. In equilibrium, the price of a noise permit is equal to
both the marginal pro¯t of the additional °ight from/to the airport and to
the disutility of additional noise disturbance in the most disturbed area. Like
any other market for tradeable permits, this market for noise permits o®ers
a distinct advantage over traditional instruments like command-and-control,
urban planning or fees. Once the market is adequately designed it reaches an
equilibrium in which social bene¯t of the airlines' activity is balanced with its
social costs. Because residents have full rights on the noise permits, they are
3To our knowledge, Flughafen Dusseldorf is one airport which has pursued a policy of
house purchase in noisy areas. Some airports have been relocated in housing free areas (e.g.
Oslo, Montreal-Mirabel).
4The maximal number of permits is equal to the maximal number of movements the
airport can sustain during the speci¯ed time period.
3never worse o®. At the same time, the social costs of noise disturbances are
internalized through the purchase of noise permits by airline companies. This
makes void the debate about airport noise disturbances, and local governments
need no longer be involved in cumbersome information collection/studies on
noise disturbances and in political arbitrage between supporters of environ-
mental quality and airport economic activity. Thus, a local market where
airline companies and airport residential neighbors can trade noise permits
provides governments with an e±cient instrument to correct the aircraft noise
externalities.
Designing a market for tradeable permits in the context of noise distur-
bances raises many theoretical challenges. The ¯rst one relates to the comple-
mentarity of zones over the routes. This complementarity results from the fact
that, to °y over a route an aircraft needs to buy the permits of all the zones
of that route. We show that zones always supply tradeable noise permits and
no zone is willing to block the airplane tra±c. The impact of a speci¯c zone
on the permit price is limited by the presence of competing zones located on
di®erent routes. The second challenge relates to the spatial dimension of our
market. In particular, we analyze how the design of zones and routes shapes
the market equilibrium. We show that there exists a large class of feasible
designs and that, under some conditions, it is possible for the market designer
to replicate the socially optimal number and spatial distribution of °ights with
an appropriate design. The third challenge relates to the possibility for planes
to °y over di®erent jurisdictions where local governments' objectives naturally
di®er. The fourth challenge relates to the possibility of zones' strategic behav-
iors on the market design. The last challenge is to capture the long run e®ects
of the market for tradeable noise permit on the urban structure.
There exists a vast literature on the evaluation of the impacts of airport
activities on property values in residential areas. This literature mainly focuses
on the environmental impact of airports on neighboring residents and economic
activity. McMillen (2004), Nelson (2004) or Schipper (2004) propose recent
updates. On the one hand, Schipper (2004) shows that the medium value
of environmental costs in a set of 35 European airport areas is 0.0201 Euro
per passenger-km, the noise costs counting for 75 pc.5 Numerous empirical
studies have con¯rmed that aircraft noise in°uences property values around
airports. Using the hedonic approach, Baranzini and Ramirez (2005) have
recently used housing market data to infer the noise impact on housing rents
in Geneva, Switzerland. They show that the impact of all sources of noise on
5This means an environmental cost of about 2000 Euro per 100-seat aircraft °ight over
1000 km.
4housing rents is about 0.7 per cent per acoustic decibels 6 and about 1 per cent
when considering exclusively airplane noise in the airport area. Interestingly,
this measure does not signi¯cantly change with noise measuring procedures
and with the institutional structure of the housing market (private versus
government ownership). On the other hand the local economic bene¯ts of
airports are generally signi¯cant, covering tax revenues and direct and indirect
employment opportunities. As soon as expansions are to be discussed, these
issues become much trickier. Opening of new runways typically exacerbate the
dilemma between noise disturbances and economic bene¯ts. According to the
US Federal Aviation Administration 7, 18 of the 31 large hub airports in the US
plan to add runways in the next decade. On the other hand, Brueckner (2003)
estimates that the O'Hare expansion would raise service related employment
in the Chicago area by 185,000 jobs. Yet, this literature on costs and bene¯ts
of airport activity and noise disturbances does not address the problem of
internalization of the externality between aircrafts, airports and residents.
One may also wonder about the ability or the willingness of governments
and relevant institutions to implement the optimal number and spatial distri-
bution of aircraft movements. In 2001, the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO) Assembly endorsed the concept of a \balanced approach"
to aircraft noise management.8 This consists of identifying the noise prob-
lem at an airport and then analyzing the various measures available to reduce
noise through the exploration of four elements, namely (i) reduction at source
(quieter aircraft), (ii) land-use planning and management, (iii) noise abate-
ment operational procedures and (iv) operating restrictions. This organization
aims to address the noise problem in the most cost-e®ective manner. In a re-
cent directive, the European Commission also advocates a similar \balanced
approach" to aircraft noise management (Directive 2002/30/EC, European
Commission, 2002). The European Commission's aims are however broader
than those of ICAO as the Commission seeks to limit or reduce the number
of people signi¯cantly a®ected by the harmful e®ects of noise, and to achieve
maximum environmental bene¯t in the most cost-e®ective manner. The cost-
e®ectiveness of the policy is clearly claimed but the choice of the policy instru-
ment able to implement the policy remains open, and this is the very purpose
of this article.
6A unit of acoustic decibel (dBA) is a (logarithmic) measure of the sound pressure and
therefore of the intensity of a sound perceived by humans. Because a sound is perceived
di®erently according to its frequency, sound pressures are corrected by a \A weighting ¯lter".
7Source: US Department of transportation.
8See www.icao.int.
5Finally, our discussion on a market for tradeable noise permits also relates
to environmental economics. Although tradeable permits have been promoted
as a policy instruments for environmental issues since Dales (1968), they were
generally regarded as impractical despite their theoretically attractive prop-
erties (cost-e±ciency). Yet, since the 1990s, many instances of markets of
tradeable permits have been successfully implemented, most notably for sulfur
dioxide pollutant in the US power industry and for carbon dioxide in the EU
(see Ellerman (2005) for a comprehensive introductory note on tradeable per-
mits). All these market experiences are inspired by Montgomery (1972) who
formally showed that under a global emission constraint, competitive mar-
kets of tradeable permits yield cost e±cient allocations of pollution abatement
whatever the distribution of permits amongst polluters. In such a market, the
emission cap coincides with the total number of emission permits, those being
emitted by the regulator and trade occurring among polluters.
Clearly, a market µ a la Montgomery seems inappropriate for our subject
of concern, for two reasons. First, we are interested in a design that makes
the airport activity acceptable to neighboring residents. Since the latter are
victims of aircraft noise disturbances, this implies that property rights on noise
are granted to those residents. Second, in the previously cited cases, regulators
impose arbitrary global emission ceilings. By contrast, we look for a market
design that is able to implement the socially optimal allocation of air tra±c
amongst aircraft routes and that does not require the regulator's intervention
after the creation of the market.
This article o®ers a contribution that is both policy-oriented and method-
ological. It presents an original and e±cient policy instrument to regulate
noise disturbances around airports. It proposes a new application of the con-
cept of tradeable permits to the issue of noise exposure, with an emphasis on
the spatial dimension of the problem.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setting while
Section 3 derives and discusses our proposal for a market for tradeable noise
permits. Section 4 proposes the optimal market design in the standard case
of price taking zones. In Sections 5 and 6, two extensions are considered, one
when there are °ights over independent jurisdictions, and the other when some
zones are strategic. In all cases we will see that the optimal solution can be
implemented, but under speci¯c conditions. Section 7 develops the short run
and long run equilibria and shows how the market for tradeable noise permits
shapes the city structure. The conclusion follows.
62 The setting
2.1 The airport
Let us consider a civil airport located in the neighborhood of a large city. Air
tra±c is organized along several routes that airplanes may take when they
land and take o®. Landing and take-o® routes are determined by exogenous
technical characteristic, in particular the direction of wind. Yet, within the
same set of technical parameters, there exist several route possibilities. For
example, after the take-o®, aircrafts may remain at low altitude, or go up,
and they may go right or left. We denote R and R the set and the number
of all technically possible routes (R = #R ¸ 1). We denote R (R µ R)
and R (R · R) the set and number of routes that are actually used. Along
a route r 2 R, airplanes generate noise disturbances that vary according to
their altitude and acceleration. Let t be the distance from the airport on a
given route and let yr be the total number of planes on route r.
2.2 The residents
The residents are homogenous with respect to their income and disutility from
noise disturbance but they di®er according to their distance t to the airport.
We shall assume that aircrafts are homogeneous in term of their noise emission.
Therefore, residents are concerned only about the number of °ights over their
location.
Thus, resident i located on route r is endowed with an individual utility
function equal to Ui
r(t;yr) = Ii ¡dr(t;yr), where Ii is her income and dr(t;yr)
is her disutility from noise disturbances. This disutility ¯rstly depends on the
distance from the airport: in general, the closer to the airport, the worse are
the noise disturbances. It secondly depends on the number of °ights. For
simplicity we assume that dr(t;yr) = ±r(t)y2
r=2 where ±r(t) is a location-noise
disutility parameter on that route. The parameter ±(t) re°ects the loss of
utility su®ered by a resident when an aircraft °ights over the location t on
route r. So, ±(t) is typically larger in locations where aircraft have lower
altitude, boost engine power and/or use °aps. This parameter depends on the
pro¯le of the route, which we take as given.9 Figure 1 depicts an example of an
airport with several routes as well as an example of a pro¯le of location-noise
disutility parameter ±r(t). The model generalizes to any increasing and convex
9The pro¯le of a route includes the altitude, direction, speed and acceleration of aircraft
that are prescribed in landing and taking-o® procedures.
7disutility function dr.
The population size at location t on route r is nr(t). Let ¯r(t) = ±r(t)nr(t)
be the total disutility parameter at location t on route r and let Tr be the dis-
tance at which noise disturbance is no longer considered.10 One then computes
the aggregate disutility parameter on route r as Br(t) ´
R t
0 ¯r(t)dt. Figure 2
provides an example of the distribution of the total disutility parameter on a
route. It is important to observe that whereas individuals located close to the
airport have higher disutility ±(t), the total disutility parameter ¯(t) may be
higher elsewhere because a larger population density there.
Insert Figure 1 about here
2.3 Airline companies
Airplanes are supposed to belong to independent pro¯t maximizing companies.
Each °ight's pro¯tability varies with its characteristics such as travelers de-
mand, °ight distance, indivisibility, etc. There thus exists vertical di®erentia-
tion of °ights which we summarize by the following pro¯t function ¼(x) = ¼¡x
where x is the index of the °ight x 2 [0;¼], Pr the price of the route taken
and ¼ > 0 the pro¯t of the most pro¯table °ight. Under this assumption, all
°ights are pro¯table. We assume for simplicity that x is uniformly distributed
on the interval [0;¼].
2.4 The ¯rst-best
It is instructive to derive the allocation of °ights under a command and control
policy where a planner determines the number and the distribution of °ights
over possible routes. The planner maximizes a weighted sum of pro¯ts and
resident utility. Its problem is to ¯nd the set of routes R and the allocation of
°ights fyrg such that
max
R,fyrg
W = °
Z y
0
(¼ ¡ x)dx ¡
X
r2R
Z T
0
dr(t;yr)nr(t)dt s.t. y =
X
r2R
yr
10Residential areas with low or zero noise disturbance are not considered for noise con-
tention issues. Typically, this applies to areas with an annual average noise level lower than
55 decibels (Ldn).
8where ° is the weight the planner puts on pro¯t. It is zero when pro¯ts do not
accrue to local residents. It can be larger than one when the airport activity
generates consumer surplus or additional peripheral activity. For example,
suppose that demands for travel are quadratic functions and that °ights incur
only marginal costs. Then consumer surplus is equal to half of the pro¯t
generated by ¯rms. In this case, a planner considering all pro¯ts and consumer
surplus would set ° = 1 + 1=2 = 3=2. When some share of consumption and
pro¯ts accrues to individuals that do not belong to the jurisdiction of the
planner, the latter would set a smaller °.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The ¯rst order conditions read ° (¼ ¡ y) = yrBr;8r 2 R. The planner's solu-
tion yields the following total number of °ights and its distribution amongst
routes:
y
o =
¼
1 +
£
°
P
r2R B¡1
r
¤¡1 and
yo
r
yo =
B¡1
r P
s2R B¡1
s
(1)
The optimal number of °ights yo increases with the aircraft pro¯tability and
decreases with the aggregate noise pollution in routes. The number of °ights
on a route falls as the aggregate noise pollution on this route increases.
Plugging this solution into the planner's objective, we get W = ¼yo=2
which increases in yo. Since yo rises with the number of routes R, the planner
chooses to use all routes: Ro = R. This result naturally follows from the
assumption that disutility is convex and, importantly, it does not mean that
the number of °ights will be equal on all routes, as shown in equation (1).
This solution would correspond to a command-and-control solution where
the regulator would ¯x the number of °ights on each route. However, command-
and-control policy requires full information on residents' preferences, airlines
pro¯tability and distribution of noise disturbances. Furthermore, even under
full information such a policy would not provide the regulator with the funds
necessary to compensate residents. Moreover, this solution can not be de-
centralized by a tax system. Indeed, whereas a tax equal to ¼ ¡ yo allows
the planner to implement the total number of °ights, there exists no tax in-
strument that allows it to allocate °ights amongst routes. Furthermore, the
redistribution of the proceeds of the fees to the residents is impossible without
knowing their preferences. So a tax system would leave unsolved major parts
of the problem (°ight allocation and compensation).
9Thus, neither command-and-control nor fees seem adequate to optimally
regulate noise disturbances around the airport. Alternative policy instruments
are required. In the following we discuss the implementation of this optimal
allocation of °ights with a market for tradeable noise permits. Such a mar-
ket would not only implement the optimal °ight's allocation but would also
compensate residents for noise disturbances.
3 The market for tradeable noise permits
We consider a market as in Coase's problem, that is, we de¯ne property rights
(the right to bene¯t from a quiet environment), and we give these rights to
the residents11 and propose to create an instrument able to solve the bargain-
ing problem between residents and airline companies, namely tradeable noise
permits. Montgomery (1972) has proved that, under perfect competition such
a market yields the optimal solution. We make Montgomery's (1972) assump-
tion that ¯rms and zone representatives are price takers. We also assume the
presence of a 'neutral auctioneer' who collects bids until he ¯nds an equilib-
rium.
The main feature of our market for tradeable noise permits is its spatial
dimension. Residents are distributed over the space under aircraft routes and
airline companies are required to buy the permits to take a route. A natural
question arises about the possible organization of residents in this market. In
this paper we assume that residents are organized in neighborhoods, which we
here call 'zones'. Zones are heterogenous with respect to the noise exposure
and to the size of the disturbed population. In each zone a representative
agent acts in the market for tradeable noise permits on behalf of his/her co-
residents. Such an agent may be a representative of a residents' association or
of a municipality. The design of this market therefore includes the choice of
routes, the de¯nition of the zones and the role of the market auctioneer. Figure
1 and 2 depict the case of an airport with various routes that each includes
three zones.
Regarding the spatial dimension (the de¯nition of routes and zones) we have
to introduce some notation. Let Tr denotes a partition of the interval [0;Tr]
of route r 2 R into several zones, and let Zr = #Tr ¸ 1 be the corresponding
number of zones. Hence Tr is equal to the set f[0;tr;1];:::; (tr;z¡1;tr;z]; :::;
(tr;Zr¡1;Tr]g. We then denote by z the index of the zone (tr;z¡1;tr;z] and we
11It is well-known that, under the Coase Theorem, the optimal solution is reached what-
ever the allocation of property rights. Distributional e®ects will di®er, however.
10denote by Zr = f1;:::;Zrg the set of such indices for route r.
3.1 The supply and the demand of noise permits
In each zone the representative is allowed to sell noise permits at a price prz.
To have one °ight passing over the zone z 2 Zr #during a speci¯ed time
period,12# an airline company must buy one permit at this price. Hence
to take the route r, the airline company must purchase the bundle of zones'
permits for a total the price of Pr ´
P
z prz. We assume that the representative
is utilitarian and considers the following aggregate utility function:
Urz(yrz) ´
Z tr;z
tr;z¡1
U
i
r(t;yrz)nr(t)dt
One can write Z tr;z
tr;z¡1
dr(t;yrz)nr(t)dt =
1
2
®rzy
2
rz
where
®rz ´
Z tr;z
tr;z¡1
¯r(t)dt
is a parameter measuring the total disutility over the zone. Notice that aggre-
gate disutility depends both on individual utility function and population size
in that zone.13 Given that the amount of money raised by the zone is equal to
przyrz, the representative's utility is given by
Urz(yrz) = przyrz ¡
1
2
®rzy
2
rz
For the moment, we assume that representatives are price takers. So, each
representative maximizes this function by choosing the amount of permits to
sell and considering the price prz as a given. The ¯rst order condition is equal
to prz = ®rzyrz; which yields the following supply of permits
y
S
rz(prz) = prz=®rz (2)
12The attributes of the speci¯ed time period can be day/night, or smaller time periods,
working days/week-ends. In case of several time periods, airlines redistribute their °ight
activity according the price of tradeable noise permit in each time period. For the sake of
exposition, this paper focuses on a market de¯ned over a single time period.
13We consider homogenous noise pressures amongst aircraft categories. When aircraft are
heterogenous in noise pressures, the parameters ±r(t); ¯r(t) and ®rz relate to the `average'
noise disutility at location t in zone z on route r. Incentives for noise abatement may easily
be introduced by requiring airlines to purchase shares of noise permits that are proportional
to the aircraft noise pressure.
11The demand for permits comes from airline companies. We assume that
°ights are managed by independent pro¯t maximizing companies. The latter
have to purchase a bundle of permits to take a route. The pro¯t function of
the °ight x 2 [0;¼] is now ¼(x) = ¼ ¡ x ¡ Pr where Pr is the cost of taking
route r. The demand for permits is therefore given by
y
D
r (P1;:::;PR) =
8
<
:
0 if Pr > Pr0
[0;¼ ¡ Pr] if Pr = Pr0
¼ ¡ Pr if Pr < Pr0
3.2 The equilibrium
We now de¯ne the role of the auctioneer in the market for noise permits. The
latter collects supplies and demands from residents and ¯rms and is in charge
to ¯nd an equilibrium price. As for any competitive market we assume that
the only information the auctioneer gets is the amounts of permits supplied
and demanded by residents and ¯rms on each route. As a consequence, the
auctioneer is not allowed to discriminate across zones. In our setting, this has
a particular implication: the auctioneer must propose the same price for all
zones located on a given route. Formally, prz ´ Pr=Zr 8r 2 R;8z 2 Zr.
The permits supplied by di®erent zones over a same route are perfect com-
plement for airline companies. At a given set of prices, the total supply is
given by the most restrictive use of the route in every zone. That is,
y
S
r (Pr=Zr) = min
z2Zr
y
S
rz(Pr=Zr)
Finally the instruments in that market design include the set of open routes
R µR, the de¯nition of zones fTrgr2R.
De¯nition 1 A market equilibrium consists in a set of prices P ¤
r and the num-
bers of °ights y¤
r such that, given the value of the policy instruments fR;fTrgg,
the market clears, that is, yD
r (P ¤
1;:::;P ¤
R) = yS
r (P ¤
r =Zr), 8r 2 R;8z 2 Z.
Such an equilibrium implies that there exists no allocation of routes that,
at prevailing prices, would be preferred by any airline company or by any
zones' representative. It also means that no resources are lost, given that the
auctioneer makes no pro¯t.
In this market equilibrium, the zone with the highest total disutility o®ers
the smallest number of permits and thus it determines the number of °ights
12over the route. We call this zone the critical zone. This can be seen by using
the supply function de¯ned above:
min
z2Zr
y
S
rz(Pr=Zr) = min
z2Zr
fPr=(Zr®rz)g = Pr=(®rZr)
where
®r ´ max
z2Zr
®rz
is a parameter measuring the total disutility over the critical zone. Equating
this supply function with demand yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium in the market for tradeable noise permits ex-
ists and is unique. It is such that,
P
¤
r = P
¤ ´
¼
1 +
P
r2R (®rZr)
¡1 and y
¤ =
¼
1 +
¡P
r2R (®rZr)
¡1¢¡1 (3)
Given that yS
r = P ¤=(®rZr) we also have
y¤
r
y¤ =
(®rZr)
¡1
P
s2R (®sZs)
¡1 (4)
Proof. See appendix.
Clearly, the design of the noise permits' market may have an impact on the
equilibrium price and number of °ights. It is easy to show that adding new
routes reduces the prices of noise permits and raises the total aircraft activity
(R ½ R
0 ) P ¤ > P ¤0 and y¤ < y¤0). The impact of design of zones is manyfold:
it does not only depend on the number of zones on each route but also on the
de¯nition of critical zones. Suppose indeed that the market designer adds a
zone on route r, without altering any critical zones. Therefore, we have that
Zr increases while ®s;8s 2 R, remain constant. From Proposition 1, it follows
that, in equilibrium, the price of routes increases and the total number of °ights
decreases. Also, °ights are re-allocated away from route r. This needs not to
be the case for di®erent design of the routes. Suppose indeed that the market
designer adds a new zone on route r while keeping the noise disturbances equal
in every zone: ®rz ´ ®r ´ Br=Zr 8z. This implies that ®rZr remains constant
and that neither the price of routes nor the total number of °ights change as
Zr increases. By the same token, the allocation of °ights over routes remains
unchanged. This is because a rise in the number of zones is associated (1)
to a fall in the population of each zone and (2) to a reduction in its share of
13the noise permit revenue on the route, Pryr=Zr. The ¯rst e®ect reduces the
disutility of zone representatives who, at a given price, augment their supply of
noise permits. The second e®ect reduces the revenues of zone representatives
who restrict their supply. In equilibrium the two e®ects exactly balance.14
Finally, it is easy to construct examples where the market designer adds new
zones but reduces the size of critical zones so that the equilibrium permit price
fall and the number of °ights increases. Actually, in the design of zones (Tr),
the number of zones and the size of the critical zones are, to some extent,
substitute instruments.15
The properties of the market for noise permits crucially depends on the
complementarity of noise disturbances on each route. Indeed, noise distur-
bance is a complementary bad for all zones on the same route since aircrafts
must °y over all those zones. Typically, this may lead to a "tragedy of the
commons" where agents do not internalize the global e®ect of their decisions.
In our context, each residents' representative owns the right to issue noise per-
mits and does not internalize the bene¯ts that other zones have. One may
conjecture that the number of permits and °ights is ine±ciently low. Another
way to see this is to observe that noise permits o®ered by di®erent zones on
a same route are complementary goods. Therefore noise permits is suspected
to be subject to Cournot's conjecture about under-provision of complemen-
tary goods. In this conjecture, independent suppliers of complementary goods
would set ine±ciently high price levels because they would not internalize the
e®ect of their decisions on others. In our setting, the tragedy of commons
exists but is under the control of the market designer. By de¯ning the zones,
the latter is able to tune this e®ect and is also able to set the level of °ight
activity. Notice that the market designer is even able to neutralize the tragedy
of commons by designing homogenous zones (®rz ´ ®r ´ Br=Zr). In this case
the creation of new zones is balanced with a smaller disutility in the zones,
which leaves prices and °ight activity unchanged.
Because the division of routes into heterogenous zones allows to tune the
total air tra±c, it constitutes an important aspect of the design of a market for
noise permits. In the following we show that this market allows the implement
the social planner's solution.
14These e®ects may not balance if zone representative are not utilitarian. Yet, the as-
sumption of utilitarian zone representatives constitutes an interesting benchmark.
15In practice, it may be unrealistic to consider the very large number of zones on a route
of a given size.
144 An optimal market design
The market designer has a considerable degree of freedom in the divisions of
routes into zones. It then is natural to ask whether and when an appropriate
market design leads to the social planner's outcome in terms of route allocation
and total number of °ights.# In our market for tradeable permits the planner
has the ability to choose two sets of instruments: the routes and the de¯nition
of zones. In this section we show the condition under which the market designer
is able to implement the social planner's optimal solution by an adequate choice
of these instruments. To this end, we compare the ¯rst best allocation with
the competitive equilibrium. We do this, ¯rst, in the general setting. Then,
we simplify the market design by imposing that all zones have equal length in
all routes. Finally we consider the case where noise disturbances cover several
jurisdictions. In all cases we will see that the optimal market design for the
market of tradeable noise permits is achievable for some set of parameters.
4.1 The generic case
Can the market designer de¯ne the routes and the zones such that the market
for noise permits replicates social planner's optimal solution? The instruments
for the market design include the set of routes R 2 R and the de¯nition of
zones fTrg. We say that the planner can implement the optimal number and
allocation of °ights with a market for noise permits if and only if there exists
a set of instruments (R,fTrg) such that y¤
r = yo
r 8r 2 Ro. The e±cient route
allocation will be obtained if and only if
yo
r
yo =
y¤
r
y¤, that is, by using (1) and (4)
P
s2R (®sZs)
¡1
P
s2Ro B¡1
s
=
(®rZr)
¡1
B¡1
r
8r 2 R (5)
The e±cient activity level will be reached if and only if y¤ = yo, that is, by
using (1) and (3) P
s2R (®sZs)
¡1
P
s2Ro B¡1
s
= ° (6)
These two equalities imply
®rZr =
1
°
Br; 8r 2 R (7)
Furthermore, plugging expression (7) in (5) yields the equality
X
s2R
B
¡1
s =
X
s2Ro
B
¡1
s
15which implies that R = Ro. Since Ro = R, the planner allows residents
located on any feasible routes to supply noise permits: R = R.
Condition (7) determines the trade-o® in the design of the market for noise
permits. To ful¯ll this condition, the market designer can either adapt the size
of the critical zone or the number of zones. Note that the value of ®rZr used
in expression (7) is a function of the design of zones. This function ®rZr is
bounded below by Br when there is only one zone (Zr = 1). As shown in the
proof below, it also is easy to ¯nd a design of zones such that this function ®rZr
is made equal to any real number above Br. As a result there always exists a
design of zone such that the value Zr®r lies above Br. From this argument,
it comes that the market designer will be able to ¯nd a design of zones that
veri¯es condition (7) only if ° is not too larger, formally, if ° · 1: The following
proposition states the necessary and su±cient condition for implementability.
Proposition 2 The social planner's optimal allocation of °ights can be im-
plemented by a market for tradeable noise permits if and only if ° · 1. In this
case, the market designer opens all feasible routes (R = Ro = R) and sets the
design of zones fTrg such that ®rZr = Br=°; 8r 2 R.
Proof. See Appendix.
Under Proposition 2 the market designer is able to implement its optimal
allocation of °ights by an appropriate design of zones only if he/she puts
not too large weight on the economic activity of aircraft (° · 1). In this
case, he/she prefers a low aircraft activity and he/she can raise either the
number of non-critical zones or the size of the critical zones so that the prices
of routes increase. The number of zones and the size of the critical zones are
therefore substitutable instruments, which gives the planner some freedom in
market design. By contrast, the planner is not able to implement its optimal
solution with a market for tradeable noise permits when he/she puts too high
a weight on pro¯ts or economic activities (° > 1). In this case, he/she desires a
°ight activity that con°icts too strongly with the residents' interest. Residents
indeed set prices of tradeable noise permits that are too high and the aircraft
activity remains too small compared to the optimal level even if the planner
has reduced the price of °ying over a route to its minimal value (when Zr = 1).
It is interesting to discuss the situation where noise disturbances are uni-
formly distributed over each route. For instance, this can occur when aircrafts
keep the same altitude on neighborhoods. In this case, the location-noise disu-
tility parameter is constant on each route: ±r(t) = ±r: So, condition (7) writes
16as R tr;z
tr;z¡1 nr(t)dt
R T
0 nr(t)dt
=
1
Zr°
8r
The market design requires only the information on population densities. The
left hand side of this equation represents the proportion of the population of
route r in the critical zone. Once this proportion is chosen, the optimal number
of zones can be set. For example, suppose that ° = 1=2 and that the market
design includes a critical zone covering 40 percent of the population on the
route. Then the optimal number of zones is Zr = 5.
It also is interesting to discuss the dual situation where the population
density is uniform over each route. This case approximates the situation where
one route passes over a highly populated city and another route passes over
a less dense sprawl. In this case, the population density is constant on each
route: nr(t) = nr: So, condition (7) writes as
R tr;z
tr;z¡1 ±r(t)dt
R T
0 ±r(t)dt
=
1
Zr°
8r
The market design requires only information on noise pro¯les and individual
disutility of noise exposure. Assuming that noise levels are proportionally
re°ected in the individual disutility of noise exposure, the market designer can
base his/her design of zones on the noise pro¯les.
In Proposition 2 the number of zones and the boundaries of critical zones
are two substitutable instruments. Imposing a restriction on one of these
instruments does not necessarily prevents the market designer from imple-
menting the social optimum. For instance, if the number of zones Zr cannot
be freely chosen, the market designer is still able to choose the boundaries
of the critical zone (i.e. choose ®r). Conversely, if the critical zones cannot
be freely chosen, then he/she is still able to choose the number of zones such
that condition (7) holds. However, one may wonder about the feasibility of
the implementation of the social optimum allocation when the market designer
faces some constraints on those two instruments. Of course, when the zones
are exogenously de¯ned for instance by administrative boundaries, the market
designer has no degree of freedom in his/her design and the social optimum
cannot be attained. In the following sections, we consider an intermediate
situation in which the market design is still possible but for a smaller set of
parameters.
174.2 An example of a restricted design
Let us consider for expositional purposes the case of an additional constraint
that imposes that routes have equal lengths Tr ´ T and equal number of zones
Zr ´ Z. As a result, routes are divided into equal intervals, tz¡1 ¡ tz = T=Z.
We here show that this restriction simultaneously ¯xes the number and the
boundaries of zones and that it reduces the market designer's degree of freedom
more than necessarily. By equation (7) we get that,
®rZ =
Br
°
which must be compatible with Z ¸ 1. We remind that the function ®rZ
is bounded below by Br (Z = 1). This function also is bounded above by
T¯max
r where ¯max
r ´ maxt2[0;T] ¯r(t). Indeed, zone lengths are equal to T=Z
and, when Z is large enough the disutility parameter of the critical zone, ®r;
can be approximated by ¯max
r ¤ (T=Z). As a result, ®rZ is approximated by
T¯max
r and tends to this value when Z ! 1. The market designer is then
able to implement the optimal number and allocation of °ights with a market
for tradeable noise permits if Br=° takes any value between these two bounds.
This argument yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose the market designer is constrained to design zones
and routes with equal lengths. Then, the socially optimal allocation of °ights
can be implemented by a market for tradeable noise permits if and only if
Br=(T¯max
r ) < ° · 1.
Hence, the constraint of zones of equal length does not eliminate the pos-
sibility of implementation of the social optimum via a market for tradeable
noise permits but it reduces the set of parameters ° for which this is possible.
The market designer is not able to implement the optimal allocation of °ights
when ° is too low because he/she is unable to design a set of zones that induces
a high enough price of noise permits and thus a low enough aircraft activity.
However, the restriction on equal lengths of zones obliges him/her to reduce
at the same time the size and the total disutility of critical zones, which has
the e®ect of decreasing the price.
In this section we have analyzed the design of markets for noise permits and
we have established the conditions for which a market designer can implement
the socially optimal allocation of °ight under the three following conditions:
all zones belong to the same jurisdiction, all zone representatives are price
takers and the spatial distribution of residents is given. We relax each of those
assumptions in the following three sections.
185 Flights over independent jurisdictions
In some situations airport disturbances may cover di®erent jurisdictions with
con°icting interests. The airport may for instance bring local bene¯ts to only
one jurisdiction (employment, accessibility, ...) whereas °ights pass over zones
that belong to several jurisdictions. One example is the case of the Brussels
Airport that o®ers large job opportunities to the Flemish region and that dis-
patches °ights over both the Flemish and Brussels regions. In many respects,
the two regions' governments are independent institutions. Such a case can
be handled in our setting. In this section, we establish the conditions under
which a noise permits market can be an appropriate economic instrument for
the jurisdiction that hosts the airport, receives the major part of its bene¯ts
and organizes the noise permits market.
We assume two jurisdictions A and B, with jurisdiction A hosting the
airport. Hence, each route r includes at least a zone in jurisdiction A and
maybe some zones in jurisdiction B. Let T A
r ´ f...,(tA
r;z¡1;tA
r;z];...g be the
set of all zones under route r in jurisdiction A. Aggregate noise disturbance
measure for this jurisdiction is equal to BA
r ´
R
T A
r ¯r(t)dt · Br.
We also assume that jurisdiction A is not altruistic with respect to juris-
diction B's residents and that it has a share of economic returns: °A 2 [0;°]
(°A + °B = °). When jurisdiction A plans its optimal airport activity, it
maximizes
W
A = °
A
Z y
0
(¼ ¡ x)dx ¡
X
r2R
Z TA
r
0
dr(t;yr)dt s.t. y =
X
r2R
yr
which gives the same solution as in Section 2.4 except that ° and Br must now
be replaced by °A and BA
r :
y
A =
¼
1 +
£
°A P
r2RA (BA
r )
¡1¤¡1 and
yA
r
yA =
¡
BA
r
¢¡1
P
s2RA (BA
s )
¡1
For the same reason as in Section 2, jurisdiction A chooses to open all
routes: RA = R.
The ¯rst expression shows that if jurisdiction A has the full economic ben-
e¯t of the airport activity (°A = °) then it plans a higher °ight activity than
the multi-jurisdictional planner discussed in Section 2. Indeed, jurisdiction A
promotes higher °ight activity because it accounts for a smaller number of
disturbed individuals. Yet, this statement is not always true. One can indeed
check that the necessary and su±cient condition for a higher number of °ights,
19yA ¸ yo; is given by the condition: °A=° ¸ [
P
r(B¡1
r )]=[
P
r(BA
r )¡1]. Hence,
if jurisdiction A gets a small enough share of economic bene¯t it will plan a
°ight activity smaller than the multi-jurisdictional planner's.
The second expression shows that °ight allocation amongst a route de-
creases as the noise disturbances over jurisdiction A's territory increase. In
particular, jurisdiction A will allocate a large proportion of °ights on the routes
that pass over few residents of its jurisdiction (small BA
r ).
We now ask whether jurisdiction A is able to implement its own social op-
timal allocation of °ights while not making jurisdiction B worse o®. Because a
market for tradeable noise permits cannot make residents in any zone worse o®,
residents of jurisdiction B surely have an interest to accept the implementation
of such a market. Therefore, the question simply becomes whether a market
designer is able to choose the design of routes and zones that implements ju-
risdiction A's social optimal allocation of °ights. A natural constraint in this
design is that no zone can overlap the two jurisdictions. For a given design of
routes and zones, the noise permits market satis¯es the same conditions as in
Proposition 1. As in Section 4.1, the airport activity depends on the number
and the design of zones and routes. which can be chosen to satisfy the optimal
°ight allocation for jurisdiction A's planner. Comparing the above expression
to Proposition 1, jurisdiction A must choose a design such that
Zr®r =
1
°AB
A
r 8r (8)
The argument is the same as in Section 4.1 except that there must be at
least two zones, one in each jurisdiction. There are two types of routes to
consider. First, consider the routes that do not pass over jurisdiction B. In
that case we get that BA
r = Br and that expression (8) is identical to the one
in Proposition 1. Therefore, we need the condition °A · 1. Second consider
the routes that pass over jurisdiction B. Note ¯rstly that there exist two
jurisdictions with at least one zone in each. So, the number of zones must
be larger than or equal to 2. Secondly, observe that the largest value of the
coe±cient ®r of critical zone is given by either BA
r or Br ¡ BA
r , depending
on whether the critical zone is in jurisdiction A or B. Therefore the smallest
value of Zr®r is obtained when the market designer sets the smallest number
of zones. That is, when Zr = 2 and Zr®r = 2maxfBA
r ;Br ¡ BA
r g. Finally, it
is possible to set zones so as to increase the value of Zr®r and ¯nd a market
design that satis¯es expression (8). As a result, a market design is feasible if
only if 2maxfBA
r ;Br ¡ BA
r g · 1
°ABA
r . This argument is summarized in the
following proposition.
20Proposition 4 Suppose the market designer of jurisdiction A is able to choose
the routes, the number of zones and their boundaries. Then, the jurisdiction
A's optimal allocation of °ights can be implemented by a market for tradeable
noise permits if and only if °A · minr2RBf1=2;BA
r =
£
2(Br ¡ BA
r )
¤
g where RB
is the set of routes that pass over jurisdiction B.
The model with two jurisdictions imposes two restrictions on the parameter
°A in order to allow the market designer to implement its preferred allocation
with a tradeable noise permits market. When those restrictions are binding,
the noise permits market yields a high price and a low °ight activity although
jurisdiction A puts a high weight on its own economic bene¯t and promotes a
higher °ight activity.
The ¯rst restriction (°A · 1=2) stems from the existence of a second juris-
diction that obliges jurisdiction A to design more than two zones. Since the
noise permit price increases with the numbers of zones, jurisdiction A cannot
obtain a price as low as the one obtained by the multi-jurisdiction planner who
is able to design a market with a unique zone.
The second restriction (°A · BA
r =
£
2(Br ¡ BA
r )
¤
) stems from jurisdiction
A' opportunity to shift noise disturbances to the neighboring jurisdiction B.
Jurisdiction A may indeed be willing to concentrate the °ight activity on the
routes that host only a small share of its residents (small BA
r ) but that host a
large share of the residents located in jurisdiction B (large Br¡BA
r ). Yet, this
strategy cannot be achieved by a market for noise tradeable permits because
jurisdiction B's residents do not allow the noise permit price to fall. This
line of argument gives some insight into how jurisdiction A should design the
residential zones to reach its optimal outcome. If the optimal number of zones
Zr is large (low °A), jurisdiction A may ask for bids from small associations
of residents (e.g. at district level) in both jurisdictions. If the optimal number
of zones Zr is large, it may organize one zone per route in its territory and
ask the other jurisdiction to bid on behalf of its residents. In any case, a
multi-jurisdictional government may not be required in such a context.
Note ¯nally that jurisdiction A should keep the control of the market design
over the design of routes and zones passing over jurisdiction B to be able
to implement its optimal number and spatial distribution of °ights. Indeed,
suppose this is not the case. That is, jurisdiction A aims at inducing its
optimal aircraft activity fyA
r g by setting its market design
©
T A
r
ª
that satis¯es
condition (8) while jurisdiction B is able to choose its design
©
T B
r
ª
. Because
the aircraft activity is ¯xed to fyA
r g, the noise disutility is ¯xed everywhere.
For the same reason, the demand is ¯xed to yA and the price of routes is
given by a same value P. As a result, the pro¯ts of airline companies are
21also ¯xed. Therefore, two terms of jurisdiction B's objectives, noise disutility
and pro¯ts, are ¯xed. Jurisdiction B is nevertheless able to alter the last
term in its objective related to the proceeds from noise permits on each route:
PyA
r ZB
r =
¡
ZA
r + ZB
r
¢
, r 2 RB. As a result, jurisdiction B's best strategy
is to augment those proceeds by dividing some segments of its routes into
in¯nitely, ZB
r ! 1. Jurisdiction A is obviously unable to respond to this
strategy because it cannot diminish both ZA
r and ®r to zero in order to keep
the condition (8) binding. As a result, a jurisdiction is able to implement its
optimal solution only if it receives the full set of rights on the market design.
The rights on the market design should be allocated in a way di®erent from
the residents' rights on issuing of noise permits.
6 Non competitive markets
In the above market design zone representatives and airlines are assumed to be
price takers in the tradeable permits market. This assumption is questionable.
Indeed, some airlines may be price makers as they demand a large share of
noise permits. At the same time, some critical zones are likely to be price
makers because the number of technically feasible routes is not expected to
be large, and because non critical zones have no impact on the number of
°ights over routes. Because our paper focuses on the issue of granting noise
permits to residents, it is natural to concentrate our discussion on residents'
market power. We therefore elaborate a game theoretic foundation for the
noise permits market where the zone representatives can be strategic.
We propose a market design in which each zone representative simulta-
neously decides on a ¯nite number of noise permits to supply. The 'neutral
auctioneer' allocates °ights according to the minimum number of permits on
each route. This corresponds to a Cournot Nash equilibrium where zone repre-
sentatives ¯x numbers of °ights. In this section we show the conditions under
which there exists a design of zones fTrg such the social optimal allocation
of °ights can be implemented by a market for tradeable noise permits under
imperfect competition.
Let the utility of the zone representative be de¯ned as Urz(yrz) = przyrz ¡
®rzy2
rz=2 as before. Each representative sets a number of noise permits yrz over
its zone. The market auctioneer sets the number of permits to its minimum
over each route, yr = minzfyrzg; it allocates the same price P = Pr for all
routes and all zones prz = P=Zr; and it balances noise permit supply
P
r yr
with demand y ´ ¼ ¡ P. Because the price on routes P depends on other
22zones, the utility in a zone will depend on other zones. Let y¡rz be the set of
all supplies of zones di®erent from rz: i.e. y¡rz ´ fyijgij6=rz. Utility of zone z
on route r is given by
Urz (yrz;y¡rz) =
1
Zr
P (yrz;y¡rz)min
j
fyrjg ¡ ®rz
µ
min
j
fyrjg
¶2
=2
where the market price is equal to
P (yrz;y¡rz) ´ ¼ ¡
X
s
min
j
fysjg
This utility depends on the number of °ights supplied by the critical zone on
route r, i.e. minjfyrjg; and it depends on the revenues from the sales of permit
which decrease with the number of zones Zr and with the supplies of critical
zones on all routes. A Cournot Nash equilibrium is de¯ned as the number of
°ights yc
rz such that
y
c
rz 2 argmax
yrz
Ur
¡
yrz;y
c
¡rz
¢
for all r;z
We formally derive the best response correspondences and the equilibrium
in the Appendix. We here provide an informal proof. The main idea is that
non-critical zones are never enticed to supply less than critical zones' supply.
So, the supply of critical zones will bind at the equilibrium. As a result, the
supply of a route is given by the supply of its critical zone yr ´ minzfyrzg and
the utility of the critical zone can be re-written as function Ur (yr;y¡r) that
depends on the supply of the critical zone and its rivals. The best responses
then can be written as
y
BR
r (y¡r) = argmax
yr
Ur (yr;y¡r) =
¼ ¡
P
s6=r ys
2 + ®rzZr
In equilibrium we must have that yc
r = yBR
r
¡
yc
¡r
¢
for all r: Solving this equality
for all routes r, we get
y
c =
¼
1 +
£P
s (1 + ®sZs)
¡1¤¡1 and
yc
r
yc =
(1 + ®rZr)
¡1
P
s (1 + ®sZs)
¡1 (9)
One readily checks that the number of °ights falls with the number of zones
Zr on a route r and with noise disturbances of the critical zones ®r. Also, the
routes that are allocated fewer °ights are those with higher aggregate noise
disturbances in critical zones: yc
r · yc
s () ®r ¸ ®s.
23We may compare the Cournot equilibrium with the competitive equilibrium
holding the design of routes and zones ¯xed. First, it is easy to check that the
number of permits is smaller in the Cournot situation: yc < y¤. Market power
naturally decreases the number of permits. Yet, as the number of routes (not
zones!) increases the Cournot number of permits converges to the competitive
number because yc ! ¼ and y¤ ! ¼. Note that a planner can restore the
equilibrium number of °ights by reducing the number of zones Z. Second,
comparing (4) and (9), one can show that
yc
r
yc ¸
y¤
r
y¤ ()
X
s
(®sZs)
¡1 ¡ (®rZr)
¡1
(1 + ®sZs)
¸ 0
which is true for r = argmax®sZs and false for r = argmin®sZs. Hence there
exists a subset of routes Rc 2 R that accept a larger proportion of °ights under
imperfect competition than under perfect competition and a complementary
subset RnRc that accept a smaller proportion of °ights. Routes that accept
a proportionally larger number of °ights under imperfect competition have
higher ®rZr. It instructive to study the case where the number of zones is
equal: Zr = Z. Then, it naturally comes that a route hosting a critical zone
with higher noise disturbances accepts a higher proportion of °ights under
the Cournot equilibrium than under the competitive one. In other words,
when shifting from price taking to price making behavior, such a route reduces
proportionally less its supply of permits. This is consistent with the fact that
the critical zone on this route displays a higher marginal disutility of noise
and, as a result, produces a lower supply elasticity of noise permits. Similarly,
one can study the case where critical zones have the same noise disturbance
parameters: ®r = ®. Then, a critical zone on a route with a larger number of
zones will proportionally reduce less its o®er of °ights when it is able to use
its market power. Indeed, the revenue increase caused by the contraction of
supply must be shared amongst more zones, so that incentives to exert market
power are lower.
Is it possible to replicate the optimal number and allocation of °ights under
this non competitive equilibrium? In particular, one may expect that repre-
sentatives of critical zones use their market power to reduce the °ight activity
its the socially optimal level. Comparing the non competitive equilibrium and
the ¯rst best allocation yields the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The social planner's optimal allocation of °ights can be im-
plemented by a non competitive market for tradeable noise permits if and only
if ° · minr fBr=(Br + 1)g < 1. In this case, the market designer opens all
24feasible routes (Rc = Ro = R) and sets the design of zones fTrg such that
®rZr = Br=° ¡ 1; 8r 2 R.
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the case of perfectly competitive market for noise permits, the op-
timal allocation of °ights can be replicated by the market. Yet, the higher
market power of zone representatives reduces the set of parameters ° for
which the market for tradeable noise permits implements the ¯rst best. At
a given design, critical zones o®er fewer permits in the non competitive mar-
kets so that equilibrium prices are higher and °ight activity is smaller. There-
fore, the designs under non competitive markets imply smaller °ight activity
than the same designs under competitive market. As a consequence, when
° 2 [0;minr Br=(Br + 1)] so that the planner desires a intermediate level of
°ight activity, the market designer is unable to implement this °ight activ-
ity under non competitive markets although it is able to implement it under
competitive markets.
7 Residential mobility and city structure
We have shown in the previous sections that a market for tradeable noise
permits allows the implementation of a central planner's solution. The main
advantage of tradeable permits is their ability to automatically adjust for short
term perturbations (e.g., a demand increase) and to allow the revelation of
residents' noise disutility. Thus, from a short term viewpoint, the °exibility of
this instrument ranks high. The question of how such a market may impact on
the economy in the medium and long terms however deserves some attention.
To be more precise, our objective in this section is to analyze the e®ects of
implementing a market for tradeable noise permits on the land market and,
therefore, on the structure of residential areas. The rational is that, through
the proceeds received by residents from the selling of noise permits, the housing
and land markets may be a®ected.
The key feature in the following analysis is the time horizon in which the
markets under analysis clear. One may reasonably assume that noise permits
should be traded quite frequently, say on a quarterly or annual basis. Hence,
this market clearing would occur with a higher frequency than that of the
housing market in which search and legal procedures easily span a year, or
even more. The land market is the one that clears in the longest time span,
say some years. Hereafter, we will disentangle the following three time horizons
depending on which market clears: short term (the market for tradeable noise
25permits clears), medium term (housing market clears) and long term (land
market clears). Our current interested lies in the links between these three
markets.
For this analysis, let us introduce a new kind of agent, landlords. We
model the relationship between airport, residents and landlords as a sequential
game that goes as follows. First, landlords choose the lot size which hosts
residents. Second, residents choose a place to locate. Third, the land price
adjusts. Finally, residents organize themselves and participate in the market
for tradeable noise permits. This sequential game re°ects the above mentioned
idea that noise permits are traded more frequently than land or houses. As in
Section 3 we assume that residents and their representatives are price takers.16
In this section we focus on the impact of tradeable noise permits on city
structure. More speci¯cally, we want to analyze how the population located in
each zone is a®ected by the market for tradeable noise permits. For that reason
we neglect any heterogeneity within each zone. As a consequence, we now as-
sume that zones are populated by residents with homogenous noise disutility,
that is, ±r(t) = ±rz and nr(t) = nrz, t 2 [tr;z¡1;tr;z], where nrz is the population
size within zone z on route r and where ±rz is the location noise disutility
parameter in that zone. Therefore the noise disutility parameter ¯(t) is con-
stant over each zone and equal to nrz±rz = ®rz. Under this assumption, the
objectives of residents and their zones representatives are perfectly congruent
and the redistribution of the proceeds of noise permits is not an issue.
Each resident's preference for his/her residence lot size s is described by
a concave utility function v(s) where v(0) = 0 and 1 > v0 > 0 > v00 for all
s ¸ 0. Note that the population density is given by 1=s. So, resident i's utility
is given by the revenue of noise permits, the disutility of noise, the utility and
the rent for residential space:
V
i
rz =
przyr
nrz
¡ ±rz
y2
r
2
+ v(srz) ¡ srzRrz
where Rrz is the land rent (per acre). Because residents are homogenous they
have the same use of space srz. The zone's representative has an aggregate
utility given by
Vrz = przyr ¡ ®rz
y2
r
2
+ nrzv(srz) ¡ nrzsrzRrz
Finally, let us assume that the residential area of each disturbed zone con-
sists of a land strip with unit width and with a length of Trz = tr;z¡1 ¡ tr;z.
16A similar analysis holds in the case of non competitive markets for tradeable noise
permits.
26So, Trz is both the length and the residential area of zone z on route r. In the
long run, lot sizes cover the residential area so that Trz = nrzsrz.
We solve this game backwards, starting with the equilibrium on the noise
permits market.
7.1 Short term
In the last period, the land rent Rrz and the lot size srz of each resident in zone
z on route r are given. The representative asks for a ¯nancial compensation
for the aircraft activity that maximizes his/her utility and the market for
noise permits clears. The ¯rst order condition is the same as in Section 3 and
yields the same supply of noise permits: yS
rz = prz=®rz. Hence, the market for
tradeable noise permits yields the same outcome; that is, the equilibrium price
p¤ and the °ight allocations y¤
r are given by Proposition 1. The identity of
critical zones is still given by z = argminz ®rz. The property rights on silence
given to residents provides them with some bene¯ts from a so-called windfall
gain. This corresponds to the additional utility each resident obtains from the
sales of noise permits. Indeed using (2) the total utility of a representative
over zone z can be computed as
Urz = p
2
rz=(2®rz) > 0 (10)
so that residents get a positive rent from the sales of noise permits. Therefore,
in equilibrium, resident i's utility is given by
U
i
rz =
Urz
nrz
=
p¤2
rz
2nrz®rz
=
1
2±rz
µ
P ¤
Zr
srz
Trz
¶2
(11)
which is positive, increases with the equilibrium price of noise permits P ¤ and
falls as lot size srz shrinks (and therefore population nrz rises).
The existence of windfall gains is well-known in the literature on environ-
mental economics and stems from the fact that a property right is given for free
on productive inputs which acquire a price as soon as the market for tradeable
permits is operational. As the compensation o®ered by noise permits is larger
than the noise disturbance disutility in the zones, residents earns a windfall
gain. So, as expected, the existence of this windfall gain will in°uence medium
and long term equilibria.
7.2 Mid term
In the second period, residents move across locations while the land price Rrz
adjusts. The lot sizes and critical zones are still ¯xed. Let V i
o be residents'
27utility outside the disturbed zones. Reasonably, the city is supposed to be large
enough so that residents' utility outside the disturbed zones, V i
o, is independent
of the land and permits market in the disturbed zones. Empirical evidence
supports this assumption in many cases.17 As soon as residents are mobile,
they locate in disturbed zones only if, when doing so, they do not get less
utility than outside, that is, only if V i ¸ V i
o. At the mid-term equilibrium, this
inequality binds and land rents absorb any utility di®erence. In equilibrium,
this leads to a rent de¯ned as
R
¤
rz =
v(srz) ¡ V i
o + Ui
rz
srz
(12)
Hence, windfall gains are transferred to landlords in the mid term through
higher land rents. Land rents are higher in zones where residents earned a
larger windfall gain. Resident utility is the same as in other parts of the city.
For tractability we will assume in the sequel that the windfall gains do not
outweigh residents' utility in non-disturbed areas (V i
o > Ui
rz).
7.3 Long term
In the ¯rst period, landlords decide on the lot size srz. We assume a competi-
tive land market where the landlords are numerous and price takers. They do
not consider other landlords' behavior in their decision process. In particular,
they do not anticipate the aggregate migration of residents that may result
from their lot size choices. Hence, each landlord ¯nds the optimal lot size srz
that maximizes his/her land rent R¤
rz given by (12) and taking the zone's pop-
ulation nrz as given. So, his/her optimal rent solves the following ¯rst order
condition
v(srz) ¡ srzv
0(srz) = V
i
o ¡ U
i
rz: (13)
By our assumption on v; the left hand side of this equality strictly increases
from and above zero as the lot size srz increases from zero. Therefore, landlords
reduce lot sizes in zones earning larger windfall gains Ui
rz. Because the proceeds
of noise permits are redistributed to residents, each landlord has an incentive
to divide his/her lots and to o®er a place to more residents, recouping a larger
share of the permit proceeds. At a given price of noise permits, each resident's
17By using noise exposure maps for 35 major US airports, Morrison et al. (1999) conclude
that noise disturbances typically a®ect less than 2 percent of the total number of housing
units in each considered metropolitan area.
28windfall gain Ui
rz decreases as lot sizes shrink. Yet, the windfall gain recouped
in the long-term by landlords also diminishes, since
U¤
rz
Trz
=
p¤2
rz
2®rzTrz
=
1
2±rz
µ
P ¤
Zr
¶2 srz
Trz
also falls as srz decreases. This re°ects the coordination failure amongst land-
lords.
On the long run path, as landlords reduce lot sizes, the number of residents
in disturbed zones rises so that the price of noise permits (weakly) increases
but so that the proceeds of each individual resident decrease. Windfall gains
then decrease and an equilibrium can be reached with small lot sizes. In the
Appendix we indeed show that the conditions (13) and Trz = nrzsrz yields a
unique solution with ¯nite lot size s¤
rz.
We can compare this value either to the lot size in the absence of both noise
permits and aircraft activity or to the lot size in the absence of noise permits
but in the presence of aircraft activity. First, in the absence of both noise
permits and aircraft activity, residents get no windfall gain (p¤ = Ui
o = 0) and
the long-term lot space is equal to so which solves v(s) ¡ sv0(s) = V i
o. This
is the lot size of the undisturbed areas. Comparing this to expression (13),
we can readily infer that the long term lot space with noise permits s¤
rz is
smaller than so
rz. Therefore, the introduction of the market for noise permits
and aircraft activities decreases lot sizes and thus increases the population in
each zone (s¤
rz < so and n¤
rz ´ Trz=s¤
rz > Trz=so ´ no
rz).
Second, in the absence of noise permits but in the presence of aircraft
activity, residents get the noise disturbances without any compensation. The
noise disutility must be compensated by higher lot size. This implies a fall in
each zone population. Indeed, at the long run equilibrium each resident gets
a utility equal to V i
rz = ¡±rzy2
r=2 + v(srz) ¡ srzv0(srz) which must be equal
to the utility in non disturbed zones V i
o. Therefore, the long run equilibrium
condition is equal to v(srz) ¡ srzv0(srz) = V i
o + ±rz
y2
r
2 which gives the solution
soo
rz. It is easy to check that the lot size is even larger and that population is
even smaller (soo
rz > so
rz > s¤
rz and noo
rz ´ Trz=soo
rz < no
rz < n¤
rz). We summarize
this discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 There exists a unique long term equilibrium with a market for
noise permits. In this equilibrium, land rents fully capture the windfall gain
that residents obtain in the market for noise permits. The introduction of the
market for noise permits decreases lot sizes and increases the population in
each zone (s¤
rz < so < soo
rz and n¤
rz < no
rz < noo
rz).
29Proof. See appendix.
In the long run landlords entice the residents located outside the disturbed
zones to come in the disturbed areas and to share the windfall gains o®ered to
residents. Hence, the population increases in zones, raising in turn the price
of permits and reducing the °ight activity.
Whereas the previous proposition compares lot and population sizes with
their level without noise permit market, we now compare lot and population
sizes between zones of di®erent routes. Using expression (13) we have already
established that landlords reduce lot sizes in zones earning larger windfall
gains Ui
rz. Therefore, zones with higher population density will o®er larger
(individual) windfall gains. Yet, population densities are determined by the
long run equilibrium. The following proposition determines the relationship
between those population densities and the characteristics of zones, namely
their exposure to noise and their areas.
Proposition 7 In the long term equilibrium, each resident bene¯ts from a
larger (individual) windfall gain in zones with higher population density. The
population density is higher in zones with lower individual noise exposure (±rz)
and with smaller land supply (Trz). That is, Ui
rz > Ui
rz0 () 1=s¤
rz >
1=s¤
rz0 () ±rzT 2
rz < ±rz0T 2
rz0 8z 6= z0 8r.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition goes as it follows. First, landlords divide their lots in smaller
parcels when residents bene¯t from high individual windfall gains. The pop-
ulation density is therefore larger in zones with larger windfall gains. Second,
consider two zones of equal size. Then, the one with the lower noise exposure
will have the higher population density. This is because lower noise exposures
increase windfall gains and entice landlords to attract more residents.
Finally, consider two zones with equal individual noise exposure. Then,
the zone with the smaller area will have the higher population density in the
long run. Indeed, if the smaller area had the same population density then
it would host a smaller population so that individual windfall gains would
be larger. This would entice landlords to attract additional residents, which
would increase the population density in that zone. As a result, the population
density is necessarily higher in the zone with the smaller area.
The above Proposition also gives us an additional message: the identity
of critical zones may be di®erent in the short and in the long run because
population densities are di®erent.18 This result suggests that, in order to
18To make thinks simple, let us concentrate on an example in which residents have initially
30preserve the optimality of the market design, the implementation of the market
for noise permits must be accompanied with a land use policy that restricts
changes in lot sizes.
8 Conclusion
The main strand of literature on noise disturbances around airports has ne-
glected the issue of policy design to make airport facilities internalize the neg-
ative externality to surrounding residents. In this paper we focus on Coase's
(1960) idea to achieve this goal through noise permit markets. We suggest
to organize residents in zones and to allow them to o®er noise permits that
must be bought by airline companies to °y over their zones. In such a design
the noise externality is internalized and residents can then never be worse o®
with the airport tra±c. Local governments need no longer be involved in cum-
bersome information collection/studies on noise disturbances and in political
arbitrage between supporters of environmental quality and airport economic
activity.
We show that the noise permit markets allow to achieve the planner's op-
timal allocation of °ights provided that she/he does not put too much weight
on the bene¯ts of the economic activity compared to the disutility of noise
disturbances. The possibility that some zones may be strategic players does
not fundamentally alter this ¯nding. In the long run, because the market auc-
tioneer is not allowed to perfectly discriminate, noise permits o®er a windfall
gain to residents located on the °ight routes. This entices landlords to increase
their land/house rents and to design smaller houses in the long run.
This article proposes an original solution to the regulation of noise distur-
bance around airports. We acknowledge that further research must be under-
taken on additional issues like e.g. the possible cooperative behaviors of zones,
the dominance of some airline companies in the noise permit market, a ¯ner
no noise disturbance and have same lot sizes (i.e. so
rz = so). Furthermore, suppose that
the planner is able to set zones such that each zone o®ers the same windfall gain in the
short run. This means that all zones are critical and have the same disutility parameter
®o
rz = ®o
rz0, which implies that ±rzTrz = ±rz0Trz0 since zones initially have the same short
term population density (1=so
rz = 1=so). In the long run, we then get ®¤
rz > ®¤
rz0 which is
equivalent to ±rzTrz=s¤
rz > ±rz0Trz0=s¤
rz0, or s¤
rz < s¤
rz0or, by virtue of Proposition 6, is true
i® Trz < Trz0 or equivalently i® ±rz > ±rz0. That is, population density (1=srz) is larger in
zones with higher individual noise disutility. In this case, only the zone with the highest
individual noise disutility becomes critical in the long term although all zones are critical in
the short run. As a result, in the long term changes in lot size and population density may
alter the identity of critical zones.
31organization of the market place (auctioneer's task/algorithm), the weather
constraints, the heterogeneity of aircraft noise levels and the heterogeneity of
residents.
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9 Appendices
Proof of Proposition 1 Demands for noise permits are non-increasing and
supplies are non-decreasing functions of prices Pr. There thus exists a unique
equilibrium. Because on every route r, supply is smaller than demand at
Pr = 0, the equilibrium price is interior (Pr > 0). Therefore, at the equilibrium,
routes have same prices: Pr = P ¤. Hence,
P
r yS
r (P ¤=Zr) =
P
r yD
r (P ¤;:::;P ¤)
which gives
P
r P ¤®¡1
r Z¡1
r = ¼¡P ¤. This yields equations (3) and (4).¤Proof
of Proposition 2 Let F(Tr) be the function that returns the value of ®rZr
for any design of zones Tr on route r. We just need to prove that F is de¯ned
over [Br;1). We ¯rst prove that there exists a design of zones, Tr, such that
®rZr can be made equal to any real number above Br. That is, 8x ¸ Br; 9Tr
such that F(Tr) = x. This is true for the following possible design Tr. It is
such that the number of zones Zr is set to the integer strictly above [x=Br], the
boundaries of the critical zone z are set so that ®r = x=Zr and the boundaries
of other zones z are set so that ®r > ®rz. Second we prove that F(Tr) is
not bounded from above. Indeed, choose for instance a critical zone with
small length "Tr (" > 0) that includes the location tmax
r ´ maxt2[0;Tr] ¯r(t)
and, choose non-critical zones with equal lenght "Tr=M (M ¸ 1) which is
smaller than the lenght of the critical zone. Then, the number of critical
zones is equal to Zr = 1 + M (1 ¡ ")=". For small enough ", Zr can be
approximated by M=" and ®rZr by ¯r(tmax
r )"TrZ = ¯r(tmax
r )TrM. It results
from this design that ®rZr can be set as large as wanted if M is set to a
large enough value.¤Proof of Expression (9) Let y¡rz be the set of all
supplies of zones di®erent from rz: i.e. y¡rz ´ fyr0z0gr0z06=rz. Utility of zone z
on route r is given by Urz (yrz;y¡rz) = 1
Zr [¼ ¡
P
r0 minz0fyr0z0g]minz0fyrz0g ¡
®rz (minz0fyrz0g)
2 =2. A Cournot Nash equilibrium is de¯ned as the number of
°ights yc
rz such that yc
rz 2 argmaxyrz Ur
¡
yrz;yc
¡rz
¢
for all r;z. The equilibrium
is easily characterized. Suppose ¯rst that zone rz is the critical zone on route
33r. Then, its best response to other zones' supplies is given by
b yrz (y¡rz) = argmax
yrz
Ur (yrz;y¡rz)
= argmax
yrz
1
Zr
"
¼ ¡ yrz ¡
X
r06=r
min
z0 fyr0z0g
#
yrz ¡ ®rz (yrz)
2 =2
=
¼ ¡
P
r06=r minz0fyr0z0g
2 + Zr®rz
(14)
This best response decreases with the aggregate noise disturbance ®rz. Sec-
ond, suppose that zone zr is not the critical zone on route r but that zone
rz0 (rz0 6= rz) is critical. Therefore, we must have that ®rz < ®rz0 and
b yrz (y¡rz) > b yrz0 (y¡rz0). In this case, zone rz is indi®erent to any o®er higher
than b yrz0 (y¡rz0) since such o®ers will not change the number of °ights on route
r. Also, zone rz will not o®er any number of °ights below b yrz0 (y¡rz0). In-
deed, this would reduce the number of °ights further below its preferred level
as a critical zone. Hence, the best reply of zone rz is given by the following
correspondence:
y
BR
rz (y¡rz) =
½
b yrz (y¡rz) if b yrz (y¡rz) · minz06=z yrz0
[minz06=z yrz0;1) otherwise (15)
At the equilibrium, we must have that yc
rz = yBR
rz
¡
yc
¡rz
¢
for all rz: Then, we
successively get that
y
c
r = min
z
y
BR
rz
¡
y
c
¡rz
¢
= min
z
b yrz
¡
y
c
¡rz
¢
= min
z
¼ ¡
P
r06=r minz0fyc
r0z0g
2 + ®rzZr
=
¼ ¡
P
r06=r minz0fyc
r0z0g
2 + ®rZr
=
¼ ¡
P
r06=r yc
r0
2 + ®rZr
where the ¯rst and last equalities stems from the fact that the auctioneer
takes the minimum o®er of permits on each route, where the second and third
equalities follow from (15) and (14)and , where the fourth equality uses ®r =
maxz ®rz: Solving this equality for all routes r, we get expressions (9).¤ Proof
34of Proposition 5 By comparing the Cournot equilibrium (9) with the ¯rst
best (1), we obtain
y
c = y
o () °
X
s
B
¡1
s =
X
s
(1 + ®sZs)
yc
r
yc =
yo
r
yo ()
1 + ®rZr
Br
=
P
s B¡1
s P
s (1 + ®sZs)
¡1 8r
Combining both equalities we get 1+Zr®r
Br = 1
° 8r or equivalently,
Zr®r =
1
°
Br ¡ 1 8r:
¤Proof of Proposition 6 We ¯rst prove the property ±rzT 2
rz > ±rz0T 2
rz0 ()
s¤
rz > s¤
rz0, 8z 6= z0 8r. Indeed, suppose the contrary statement that, for a given
price p¤, the inequalities ±rzT 2
rz ¸¤ hold together. Then we get 1
2±rz
³
p¤srz
Trz
´2
<
1
2±rz0
³
p¤srz0
Trz
´2
which is equivalent to v(srz) ¡ srzv0(srz) > v(srz0) ¡ srz0v0(srz0).
By (13), this implies that srz > srz0, a contradiction. We then prove the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. Using ®¡1
r = (maxz ®rz)
¡1 =
(maxz nrz±rz)
¡1 = (maxz s¡1
rz Trz±rz)
¡1 = minz (srzT ¡1
rz ±¡1
rz ), one can show that
P
¤srz =
¼srz
1 +
P
s ®¡1
s Z¡1
s
=
¼srz
1 +
P
s minz (sszT ¡1
sz ±¡1
sz )Z¡1
s
=
¼srz
1 + minz (srzT ¡1
rz ±¡1
rz )Z¡1
r +
P
s6=r minz (sszT ¡1
sz ±¡1
sz )Z¡1
s
This is a strictly increasing and continuous function of srz that has a zero at
srz ! 0 and that is linear for su±ciently high srz. Therefore, using expression
(11) it is easy to check that the right hand side of equation (13) decreases from
and below V i
o and falls to ¡1 as the lot size srz rises from 0 to 1. As a result,
equation (13) has a unique a solution. So, the long-term equilibrium lot size
exists and is unique.¤
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